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Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea
Eric A. Posner1
Alan O. Sykes2
Abstract. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has a plausible economic logic.
Jurisdiction over portions of the ocean is assigned to states which can regulate them most cheaply
and value them the most. These jurisdictional rights are subject to limits that reflect the interests of
other states in navigation and other uses of the seas. For the vast areas of the ocean that no state
can regulate, the Convention provides for an open access regime subject to simple rules, mostly
self-enforcing, to limit conflict over resources.

The law of the sea derives from an array of treaties and customary norms dating back
centuries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) represents an effort
to codify and to some extent reform the law of the sea for the modern era.3 UNCLOS has been
ratified by most major nations but the United States remains a holdout.
UNCLOS has received little attention outside the specialist literature except for
occasional flurries of press when the U.S. Senate considers the question of ratification. Yet, the
treaty is among the most significant developments in international law of the last half century.
International law traditionally sought to maintain order by dividing the world and assigning
exclusive or quasi-exclusive regulatory authority over areas to the states with the power to
control them. States were given authority over their territory and internal waters, and a small
band of coastal sea. The large tracts of ocean over which no state could assert control were left
unregulated. This state of affairs was tolerable as long as the oceans could be seen as an
inexhaustible resource. But population growth, technological change, and economic development
have increased demand for the ocean’s resources to the extent that overexploitation and
congestion have become serious problems; in the meantime, advances in maritime technology
have made control over larger portions of the ocean possible. States have responded by
extending authority over larger portions of water, albeit subject to certain limited rights of other
states; and trying to create international authorities that can regulate the areas of the ocean
beyond the reach of particular states. This effort to bring such a vast area of the globe under
international supervision is unprecedented.
Drawing on simple principles of microeconomics, this paper examines the most
important features of UNCLOS. To our knowledge, we are the first commentators to analyze the
law of the sea from an economic perspective.4 In brief, we argue that UNCLOS represents a
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broadly sensible response to a wide range of externality problems that arise when nations act
non-cooperatively to regulate (or fail to regulate) the sea. Regulatory jurisdiction is for the most
part allocated to the nations that value it the most and can exercise it most cheaply. Constraints
on jurisdiction respond to externalities that arise when regulators tend to ignore the welfare of
other nations. International cooperation on regulatory matters is encouraged and facilitated where
national regulation alone is inadequate.
Section I of this paper provides an overview of the externality issues that arise from the
regulation or non-regulation of the sea, and introduces some economic concepts that bear on how
best to address them. Section II then considers particular issue areas within UNCLOS, and
evaluates the approach of UNCLOS to each issue from an economic perspective. These issue
areas include property rights in fisheries and seabed minerals, maritime pollution, crimes, piracy,
navigation and various aspects of border protection. The abiding theme is that UNCLOS
generally facilitates global efficiency gains through its approach to these issue areas. The
Conclusion briefly considers some objections to U.S. ratification of UNCLOS and suggests that
they are unpersuasive.
I. The Economic Rationale for an International Law of the Sea
The economic theory of international law suggests that the primary function of
5
international law, whether customary or treaty law, is to ameliorate international externalities.
International externalities arise from the activities of both individuals and states, and it is easy to
understand why nations acting unilaterally may fail to address them. For example, consider a
firm conducting an activity that generates pollution, and assume that the pollution flows across
the border to another nation. Because the harm occurs abroad, the government of the nation in
which the firm is located may have no incentive to take measures to control the pollution, even if
such measures would be worth their costs from a global perspective. Likewise, imagine a
national government engaged in some form of domestic regulation that raises costs for regulated
firms. If the regulated firms are in large part foreign and will lower their prices to absorb some of
the costs of regulation to avoid losing customers, the regulating government may regulate
6
excessively in the sense that the global costs of regulation may exceed its benefits. When the
behavior of governments deviates from global cost-effectiveness, an opportunity for beneficial
cooperation arises that can improve the welfare of all nations as long as cooperation is not too
costly. Such cooperation is often (although not always) orchestrated through international law.
International externalities are a commonplace with activities at sea. In particular, the sea
contains a wealth of valuable resources, including food, minerals, energy, and materials for
bioresearch. Such resources that are un-owned or found in a “common pool” may be exploited
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inefficiently due to some familiar externality problems associated with the creation of property
rights. As we shall suggest, international cooperation is necessary to address these externalities.
The sea is also a means of transportation, which can become subject to congestion and
navigational hazards. In addition, various activities that endanger life or property, or that
undermine government efforts to regulate on land or to protect territory, occur at sea. These
activities include shipboard crimes, piracy, smuggling, and espionage. The sea is also the locus
of important military activity. With some of these activities, externalities arise because the
activities of one government interfere with the legitimate activities of another. In other cases, the
problem lies with a kind of “free rider” problem and an attendant lack of incentive on the part of
governments to control the harmful acts of individuals. Again, international cooperation is
required to address such issues.
We divide the discussion of externality problems into two sections. The first concerns
“common pool” issues, and the second encompasses other types of externalities.
A. Common Pool Resources and the Sea
Until such time as a government or private actor asserts dominion over them, the valuable
resources of the sea are un-owned and available to all comers. In this sense, they represent a
common property or “common pool” resource. A common pool resource has two defining
characteristics: (a) no single actor has established control over it; and (b) the consumption of the
resource is to some degree “rivalrous,” meaning that when one actor consumes the resource, its
quantity or quality is diminished for other potential consumers.
1. Background Economics
The exploitation of common pool resources can create some important and familiar
7
negative externalities. One type of externality leads to excessive consumption of resources and
the dissipation of social surplus from their exploitation. Another related externality leads to
excessive investment in search for resources.
a. Overexploitation
Assume that resources in a common pool are available to any actor who can capture
them, and that no actor can secure control of the entire common pool. Put differently, users can
lay claim to a “flow” of resources from the pool, but not to the pool itself (to the “stock” of
resources). For example, a fishing enterprise may take ownership of any fish that it can catch in a
setting where no one owns the fishery as a whole.
Because consumption of common pool resources is at least partly rivalrous by definition,
the consumption of the resource by one actor raises the cost to other actors of obtaining the same
7
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quantity of the resource. To use the fishing example once again, fishing by one enterprise will
generally reduce the stock of fish and thus make it more costly for another enterprise to secure a
catch of given size. The effect on the costs of other enterprises is an externality assuming that
users of the resource will maximize their own returns from exploiting the resource without
regard to the increased costs imposed on others.
The result of the externality is over-consumption of the resource and dissipation of the
economic surplus available from its exploitation. To illustrate why, continuing with the fishery
example, imagine a competitive fishing industry in which each fishing enterprise is small.
Assume that the influence of each small fishing enterprise on the cost of catching fish is de
minimis, and that each enterprise ignores the tiny effect that its own activity has on its own costs
as well as the costs of others. Thus, each enterprise perceives that the marginal returns to fishing
effort are equal to the average returns to fishing effort. Further, let each fishing enterprise obtain
labor for fishing at a fixed wage rate. In a “competitive equilibrium,” each enterprise will fish up
to the point where the cost of additional labor is exactly equal to the perceived value of the catch
from additional labor, which will equal the average returns to fishing per unit of labor as noted. It
follows that the total wage bill for the industry will equal the value of the total catch, and the
8
fishery generates zero net surplus.
Suppose, by contrast, that the entire fishery is owned by a single enterprise that seeks to
maximize its value. Assume further that the enterprise knows how the total amount of fishing
will affect the costs of fishing. Such an enterprise will then correctly perceive that the marginal
return to additional fishing labor is below the average return, and will then maximize profit by
fishing only up to the point where the marginal cost of labor is equal to the (correctly perceived)
9
marginal return to labor. This policy in turn maximizes the value of the fishery.
Intermediate cases exist in which multiple fishing enterprises exploit the fishery, but each
is large enough to appreciate the effects of its own fishing effort on costs. Although such
enterprises will tend to take account of the effects of their activity on their own costs in a profitmaximization calculus, they will nevertheless ignore the adverse effects on the costs of other
enterprises. An externality remains, and over-exploitation of the resource still results albeit to a
8
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lesser degree. In general, as the number of enterprises increases (and their behavior thus
approaches that in the competitive case above), the magnitude of the externality increases and
the over-exploitation of the resource increases.
Although the discussion to this point has used the illustration of a fishery, the general
problem it identifies applies to other resources at sea. In the case of energy resources such as oil
and natural gas, for example, the exploitation of an oil or gas deposit by one enterprise will
reduce underground pressure and increase the costs of extraction for other enterprises drawing
from the same deposit.
Maritime pollution may also be understood as a variant of a common pool problem. In
this case, the common “pool” is the sea itself, and pollution is the equivalent of consuming a
portion of it. Pollution raises the costs (or equivalently for economic purposes, lowers the value)
of activities at sea by others—for example, by destroying marine life that otherwise would be
caught and consumed. Because this negative externality is not taken into account by polluters,
the tendency will be to pollute excessively.
b. Excessive Search
The externality that leads to overexploitation of a resource, as noted, arises when multiple
enterprises compete for the flow of resources from a common pool. It does not arise when the
common pool has a single owner—that is, it does not arise when a single entity has the right to
the entire “stock” of the resource contained in the common pool. But an analogous externality
problem does arise when multiple enterprises compete for the right to become the single owner.
In particular, when ownership of a common pool is given to the enterprise that is first to discover
it, the result will be overinvestment in search for common pool resources.
Enterprises will invest in search up to the point where the marginal cost of additional
search is equal to the marginal expected return. Suppose in this regard that the number of
enterprises is so large that marginal returns to search and the average returns appear to converge.
Suppose further that each relatively small enterprise can purchase inputs into the search process
at a fixed price. Each enterprise will then expand its search for new resources to the point where
the costs of exploration are equal to the average expected return. As in the classic common pool
situation, the value of the resource is fully dissipated—the expected returns from search (in
10
expectation) are equal to the value of the resources expended on search.
In essence, undiscovered resources present their own common pool. With open access to
the process of search, resources are again dissipated because firms ignore the fact their own
efforts at search make search more costly for other enterprises—as discoveries are made, new
discoveries become harder to make.
As before, this problem disappears when only a single enterprise has the right to search.
If search rights belong to a single entity, it will take proper account of the effects of its own
efforts at search on its own costs, and the external effects on other entities will vanish. Also as
10

See Eggertsson, supra note ___; Lueck & Miceli supra note___.

5

before, the tendency toward over-investment in search rises as the number of entities allowed to
search rises.
2. Implications: The Role of Government and International Cooperation
The simple economic points developed above assume that rational private actors pursue
their own economic interests without regard to the interests of other actors. Conceivably, as
highlighted in the work of 2009 Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, private actors may overcome the
resulting externality issues through voluntary cooperation.11 Perhaps the fishing enterprises that
exploit a particular fishery will voluntarily agree to limit fishing, for example. But in many cases,
voluntary private cooperation will be too difficult to orchestrate or enforce, and a role for
government arises.
In cases where private actors compete for the flow of resources from a common pool,
governments may be able to increase the value of the resource by restricting the rate at which the
resource can be consumed. Governments may restrict fishing hours or the volume of the catch in
a fishery, restrict the rate at which oil can be withdrawn from an oilfield, and the like. Similarly,
with respect to maritime pollution, governments may restrict or prohibit polluting activity.
Governments may also devise a single owner solution in some cases, as by auctioning off
the mineral rights for an entire oil or gas field on public lands to the highest bidder. As noted, a
single owner structure will generally lead private actors to maximize the value of a known
common pool resource.
Analogous possible solutions exist for the problem where multiple enterprises compete
for ownership of undiscovered resources and as a result over-invest in search. Governments may
restrict the right to search to only a few enterprises or a single enterprise, perhaps by
administering an area of potential discoveries as public lands.
Of course, any government solution to these problems is costly. The costs of creating and
enforcing the regime must be considered, as must the costs of resources that may be dissipated
by private enterprises that lobby to affect the regime. In some cases, government intervention
may be more costly than it is worth.
More important for our purposes, however, the difficult tradeoffs that must be confronted
in the management of common pool resources will often be a purely domestic affair. Perhaps
over-fishing in Lake Okeechobee is a problem, for example, but it is unlikely to materially affect
the welfare of nations other than the United States and we would not expect international law to
emerge that addresses the subject. When the geographic scope of a common pool resource is
confined to the territory of a single nation, international externalities typically do not arise.
Resources at sea, however, are by definition outside the land territory of any individual
nation. This observation suggests an immediate rationale for international cooperation on two
margins.
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First, nations (and their citizens) may assert competing claims to the common pool
resources of the sea. The United States may claim the right to all oil and gas discovered within x
miles of the U.S. coastline, for example, and other nations may dispute that claim. International
cooperation is thus valuable to resolve competing claims over resources. Absent a resolution of
these claims, costly international conflicts can arise. And even if conflict does not result,
unresolved competing claims are themselves manifestations of the common pool problem. Each
actor will seek to maximize the value of the resource to itself, without regard to the costs
imposed on other parties with competing claims. Over-exploitation of the resource will follow,
under circumstances in which no government has the generally recognized authority to abate it.
Second, circumstances will arise in which no government can or will claim appropriate
jurisdiction over the entire common pool. This situation may arise because the resource lies in an
area over which no nation wishes to claim jurisdiction, or because the resource is mobile across
geographic areas under the jurisdiction claimed by different nations. In either instance, the
fundamental common pool problem reemerges.
In the first case where no government claims jurisdiction over a resource, private actors
may over-exploit the resource as they compete for the flow of returns, or may invest excessive
amounts in search for a resource over which they can assert dominion privately. In some
instances, the global costs of abating these problems may exceed the benefits. But in other cases,
global gains from controlling the rate of exploitation or search may be possible, yet no nation
undertakes the task because of a free rider problem—the nation that regulates the resource will
bear the costs of regulating, but the benefits will flow in part to others. Here, international
cooperation can enable nations to share the costs of regulation appropriately, or can create an
international regulatory authority, to abate the free rider issue.
Now consider the second case where a resource is mobile across the jurisdiction of
different countries. Such mobility is characteristic of much marine life, and of the sea itself.
Here, a common pool problem arises for a somewhat different reason. Each nation will tend to
maximize the value of the resource to itself without regard to the adverse effects on other nations
who wish to exploit the same resource. If salmon migrate between the waters of the United
States and Canada, for example, and even if both nations undertake self-interested fishery
regulation with respect to salmon, regulators may tend to ignore the fact that local salmon fishing
(say, in Canada) increases the costs of salmon fishing elsewhere (say, in the United States).
Again, the tendency will be toward over-fishing, and cooperation between the two nations can
usefully address the problem. As another example, if maritime pollution in waters under the
jurisdiction of the United States travels North to Canada, the United States may tend to underregulate pollution in the waters that it controls. Again, international cooperation to establish
higher pollution standards may be warranted.
3. Proximity as a Basis for Resolving Competing Claims: The Coastal Seas
To recapitulate, common pool issues of one sort or another arise with respect to all of the
valuable resources of the sea—fisheries, undersea oil and gas, seabed minerals, and the sea itself.
7

As indicated, the potential role for international cooperation (and for UNCLOS) in relation to
these issues is threefold: to resolve competing claims between states (and their nationals) over
resources; to encourage and facilitate international cooperation when governments decline to
engage in optimal regulation because of free rider problems; and to improve the quality of
regulation when common pool resources are mobile across jurisdictions. Of course, it remains to
be seen how well UNCLOS succeeds at these tasks.
With respect to the first of them—the resolution of competing claims—we shall see that
the most important guiding principle in UNCLOS is the proximity of the resource to the
claimant. The approach of UNCLOS to the coastal seas, in particular, is to award property rights
(or, more precisely, the power to create them) to the coastal state. The logic is straightforward.
Coastal seas are close and easy to patrol, and their resources are comparatively cheap to exploit
for nearby actors. As a rule of thumb, the state in closest proximity to the resources will have a
cost advantage in exploiting the resources and in regulating to prevent overexploitation or
excessive search. Coastal states thus have strong incentives to make rules for them and to enforce
those rules.
Not only is an allocation of authority to the coastal states likely to be the most efficient
option, it is also likely essential if international cooperation regarding the allocation of
jurisdiction is to be stable. In general, cooperation will not arise unless nations gain more from
cooperation than from opting out of it. For the reasons just given, if nations were denied
authority over resources proximate to their coast under any proposed international arrangement,
they would likely conclude that participation in the international arrangement was unattractive.
Of course, proximity cannot be the sole consideration in the choices that must be made by
a treaty like UNCLOS. In some instances, resources may be located close to the coasts of
multiple nations. Some reasonable basis for dividing them must be fashioned that will be
acceptable to all participants.
One must also ask, “how close is close?” Beyond a certain distance, proximity to the
coast may become a poor proxy for which nation can regulate most cheaply. Moreover, it would
be a mistake to suppose that the proper geographic scope of regulatory jurisdiction is the same
for all resources. The capacity to monitor activities and enforce regulations may vary
considerably according to the nature of the resource—it may be far easier to detect and prevent
unacceptable offshore drilling at long distances, for example, than to detect and prevent
unauthorized fishing at such distances. As shall be seen, these considerations come into play in
various aspects of UNCLOS.
4. Distant Resources and the High Seas
As noted, the approach taken by UNCLOS to the coastal seas is akin to the assignment of
private property rights in land. An alternative approach to regulation, however, is analogous to
open access regimes that are subject to a set of rules that all actors must obey. For example, a
government might allow anyone to enter a lake and catch fish, but subject them to regulations
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governing how many fish they catch, the equipment they use, and so forth. As we shall see,
UNCLOS takes this general approach to the resources of the high seas.
Thus, the resources of the high seas are generally subject to open access (seabed minerals
presenting an exception that we will discuss in some detail later), yet states must obey certain
rules in the navigation of the high seas and the exploitation of its resources. We think that the
explanation is again straightforward. States may often gain little from the resources in the high
seas due to the high costs of exploiting them, and the cost of enforcing rules to limit
overexploitation or excessive search on the high seas may also be prohibitive because the high
seas are remote and difficult to patrol. Dividing up the high seas among the states thus would
serve little purpose because states would not control their portions of the high seas even if given
jurisdictional rights to them. Indeed, one might ask why states would bother to create any rules
at all for the high seas. As we will see, the answer for the most part is that those rules essentially
solve very simple coordination problems, akin to the rules of the road, and thus are largely selfenforcing. UNCLOS actually does little to solve some of the thorniest common pool problems
like overfishing, which would require real enforcement efforts and careful monitoring.
B. Other Externality Issues
The law of the sea must confront a variety of additional issues that go beyond
conventional common pool problems, but that nevertheless involve situations in which the
actions of one nation can have adverse impact (create negative externalities) for others. One can
again divide cases into situations in which the activities of nations at sea conflict in some way,
and cases in which problems arise at sea that no nation has adequate incentive to address acting
unilaterally.
The clearest example of the first type of situation is the conflict between international
navigation and the desire of nations to protect themselves against activities that infringe their
property rights or territorial integrity. Such activities include smuggling, illegal immigration,
espionage, and poaching of resources. As we suggested above, it is natural to allocate
jurisdiction over such matters closely proximate to a coastline to the coastal state. But the coastal
state might respond by prohibiting foreign vessels from passing near its coast, or near an area
containing resources that it controls. Such policies can increase the costs of navigation
considerably, and some mechanism must be devised to accommodate the tension.
Accordingly, property rights in coastal seas are not absolute. States have general
discretion to regulate them but cannot, for example, deny certain navigation rights to other states.
This pattern has a simple explanation. We have already suggested why every state likely values
the resources of its coastal sea more than any other state. But it is also likely that every state
values certain use rights in the coastal seas of other states—prominently, the right to
navigation—more than those other states value the right to be free of such rights. For example,
the United States values the right to send ships near the coast of Spain more than it values the
right to block Spanish ships from traveling along the coast of the United States. Spain has a
similar set of valuations. If these assumptions are correct, states are better off with limited
9

property rights (that exclude the power to block navigation) than with absolute property rights
(that include the power to block navigation).
Crimes at sea offer examples of situations that straddle the two classes of problems
delineated above—sometimes multiple nations will wish to exercise jurisdiction over the
purported criminal, and in other instances no nation may have an adequate incentive to act
against the criminal. A shipboard homicide, for example, is a possible example of the first
situation, in which multiple nations may claim an interest based on the nationalities of the ship,
criminal, and victim, and the geographic location of the crime. Other crimes such as piracy in the
open ocean may attract no government action—the nation from which the offending ship
emanates may have little interest in sanctioning a crime that benefits its nationals, and those
harmed by such crimes may face a severe free rider problem in patrolling the oceans to prevent
piracy. In both types of situations, it is in the interest of the international community to allocate
jurisdiction over the criminal act to the nation that can most cheaply take cost-effective steps to
12
deter crime and, if necessary, to provide an incentive for that nation to exercise its jurisdiction.
It remains to be seen how effective UNCLOS may be in addressing such potential problems of
underenforcement.
***
With this background in hand, we now turn to the substantive rules of UNCLOS that bear
upon these various subjects. We will argue that, for the most part, they are broadly consistent
with a sound economic approach to the underlying externality problem, with the stipulation that
UNCLOS does not (and cannot reasonably be expected to) solve all of the international
externality problems that one can identify.
II. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCLOS divides the seas into zones over which states have greater or lesser authority.
At one extreme are inland seas, over which a state has exclusive control, just as it does over its
landmass. At the other extreme are high seas, over which no state has control. In between are
certain coastal bodies of water, such as bays, which are treated as inland seas; the coastal sea,
which forms a belt that projects twelve nautical miles from the coast; the contiguous sea, which
extends another twelve miles; and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which projects out 200
miles from the shore. As we will see, a state’s right to control activities on or under water
decreases as distance from the coast increases. In addition, UNCLOS identifies certain features
of the oceans—including mineral resources in the continental shelf and the deep sea bed—to
which it gives states different bundles of rights. Certain other rules govern other geographical
configurations that have special importance for states, including straits, which connect different
parts of the high seas, and archipelagos.
12
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A. The High Seas
The starting point for our discussion is the high seas, defined by UNCLOS negatively as
those portions of sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, the territorial and
inland waters, and archipelagic waters.13 The high seas are governed by the classic principle of
freedom of the seas, which goes back to the seventeenth century. UNCLOS defines the freedom
of the seas (or “freedom of the high seas”) as:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to
Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations
permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in
section 2;14
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.15
The freedom of the seas establishes an unregulated open access regime. It therefore raises a
puzzle. If open access regimes are overexploited, why would international law create one?
To resolve this puzzle, we need to consider the alternatives. The principle of freedom of
the seas arose as a reaction to attempts by powerful states to claim exclusive control over vast
swaths of the oceans. One alternative, then, would be to carve up the oceans among all powerful
states or perhaps all states—a regime that would surely be subject to constant conflicts over
which area of the sea belongs, or ought to belong, to a particular state. Another alternative would
be to subject the oceans to the jurisdiction of some kind of international authority. A final
alternative would be to give states overlapping jurisdiction over the high seas.
Freedom of the seas might best be understood as reflecting the assumption that no
country has the power to control oceans except along the coasts. The cost of patrolling,
monitoring, and punishing law violations in remote ocean spaces is just too high. These costs
would also be high for a joint international authority. There may be some limited caveats to this
proposition as we will see, but in general it seems correct.
In addition, freedom of the seas may reflect the view that overexploitation of portions of
the oceans remote from the coasts is not a serious problem. Given the vastness of the areas and
their resources, congestion and overexploitation are at most limited problems and laws are of
limited utility. Moreover, states would have weak incentives to enact and enforce any desirable
laws, so that states with exclusive jurisdiction would often fail to act. Of course, overlapping
jurisdiction would create an alternative set of potential problems because users of the high seas
might be inconsistently regulated.
13

Art. 86.
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Art. 87(1).
14

11

Rather than assign jurisdiction over portions of the high seas to states, UNCLOS lays
down a set of minimal rules that reduce the risk of conflict that might occur on the high seas. It
imposes a general duty to take into account the interests of other states, and some more particular
rules that, among other things, require ships to send signals that identify their locations and take
other steps to minimize the risk of collision.16 These rules are essentially self-enforcing. A ship
from state X benefits by making itself visible to a ship from state Y, because the ship from state
X as well as the one from state Y is harmed by a collision. Where the means of making oneself
visible to others involves a choice among technologies (such as radio bands), then it is in
everyone’s interest to use whatever technology everyone else uses and the relevant actors can
coordinate on a standard. Thus, enforcement of the minimal rules on the high seas is not a
serious challenge.17
A more ambitious set of rules for the high seas—for example, rules that protect fisheries
against possible overfishing—would pose a more significant challenge because they would
require states to expend resources with the expectation that other states do the same. But if it is
extremely costly to monitor and patrol the high seas, as we have suggested, it will also be
difficult for states to prevent free riding and defections from any rule-based regime. Accordingly,
despite the potential significance of such problems as a matter of theory, UNCLOS does
relatively little to address them. We will say more about the matter of fisheries (and whaleries) in
Section F below.
UNCLOS does grant states the authority to regulate ships that fly their flags. For
example, if a murder takes place on a ship, the state whose flag the ship flies has exclusive
jurisdiction. This rule can be given two justifications. First, to the extent that the ship has
connections with the state whose flag it flies (for example, crew and passengers are most likely
to be nationals of that state, the ship’s home port lies on the coast of that state), the state has both
an interest in regulating the ship and the capacity to enforce regulations (inasmuch as relevant
people and assets are likely to be located on the state’s territory when not on the ship). Second, to
the extent that states make their flags available to foreigners and foreign ships, the rule still
makes clear which state is responsible for order on the ship. If passengers or crew who are
nationals from other states are harmed, those states know which state to ask for help. When ships
collide, the flag states have overlapping jurisdiction, which enables them to work out a solution
without interference from other states.18
Other activities that take place on the high sea are of broader concern to a number of
different states. These include slave-trading, piracy, drug smuggling, the transportation of
nuclear weapons, and unlicensed broadcasting. UNCLOS regulates or prohibits these activities
and gives warships from any country the right to stop and inspect ships suspected of engaging in
these illegal activities.19 Here, UNCLOS gives states overlapping enforcement authority but not
16
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legislative authority—the substantive rules are limited to those that states have agreed to in
UNCLOS. This overlapping enforcement authority contrasts with the regime for run-of-the-mill
criminal activity that occurs on ships, where states have exclusive legislative and enforcement
authority.
The differences in approaches to these subjects reflect a basic tradeoff. When states have
exclusive legislative and enforcement authority, the risk of inconsistent policies is minimized,
but states may also have an incentive to legislate and enforce in a way that is biased against other
states. This risk is tolerable with respect to crimes that may occur in the course of ordinary
shipping; after all, foreign passengers and crew can avoid ships that fly the flags of states that
they do not trust. In the case of an activity such as piracy, by contrast, the activity affects the
interests of many states simultaneously, and here the limits of unilateral enforcement come into
play—any state with exclusive jurisdiction over a particular act of piracy, say, may have
inadequate incentive to expend the costs necessary to address it. Overlapping jurisdiction
enhances the chances that some state will be moved to act. Here, the risk of inconsistent policies
or parochial bias is limited inasmuch as the basic substantive rules have been hammered out in
the treaty. Some risk may remain at the enforcement level, but it is tolerated because of the
importance of increasing the chances that some state will find it in its interest to act against
piracy.
B. Inland Waters, the Coastal Sea, the Contiguous Zone; Herein Baselines, Straits, and
Archipelagic Waters
The territorial (or coastal) sea is the band of water, twelve nautical miles wide, that lies
off the coast of the state.20 The territorial sea, unlike the high seas, is a zone of exclusive control
of the state—in this way, identical to the treatment of the state’s landmass—with one important
exception. All other states have the right to innocent passage. This right includes the right to
enter and navigate through the territorial seas, whether to traverse them or to reach a port of call;
it extends to all ships, including commercial and military ships. States can regulate passage, for
example, by designating sea lanes; but they cannot prohibit it unless the passage is not innocent,
meaning that it is for the purpose of using military force or engaging in criminal behavior, or for
fishing or research, and the like.21
This treatment of territorial waters is consistent with our framework. Areas of the sea
near the coast have high value to the coastal state—much higher than that of the high seas.
Because the cost of transportation to the coastal sea is low, the value of fishing, research, mining,
and similar activities is correspondingly high. Similarly, coastal states can also easily patrol their
territorial waters and enforce the law. Airplanes and helicopters can reach them from bases on
the land; shore batteries can stand guard; the coast guard can operate from nearby ports.
Yet, the right of innocent passage is clearly of great value to foreign states. Without an
opportunity for innocent passage, ships would spend extra time and fuel circumnavigating large
20
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swaths of the sea as they travel from one place to another. At the same time, innocent passage
imposes relatively limited costs on the coastal state: congestion (but limited because the ships
may not dawdle) and the attendant risks of accident. Of course, if the right of innocent passage
did not exist under international law, the attendant inefficiencies might be eliminated through
bargaining—coastal states might charge tolls for entering their waters. But this solution is
inferior—it would involve transaction costs and presumably would also be affected by
inefficiencies associated with states’ “market power” over the relevant area of the ocean. Such
inefficiencies would arise whenever the fee charged for passage by a state exceeded the marginal
cost to that state of permitting passage, which we have suggested is very low, and when ships
responded to such fees by circumnavigating the area covered by the fee thereby increasing the
cost of navigation. A right of innocent passage reflects, in effect, a deal under which states give
up their right to charge such fees in return for being spared having to pay the fees of other states.
One might ask, Why does international law recognize a right of innocent passage for
territorial seas but not for land? After all, the two areas are otherwise subject to the same rules.
The answer is surely that innocent passage could be much more easily abused if it were applied
to the land. Ships that pass through territorial waters cannot easily stop and unload goods or
engage in criminal activity, and the cost of obtaining and docking a ship is a natural barrier. By
contrast, innocent passage for individuals onto land would enable them to enter countries without
visas and engage in various undesirable activities that would be much more costly to police.
Some of the most difficult questions that arise in connection with territorial seas concern
the baselines for defining them. Coasts are not straight lines. They have indentations and
projections; small and large islands are nearby; so are reefs; the tide ebbs and flows; rivers open
out on them. UNCLOS contains a number of rules that stipulate the baseline in areas of
ambiguity. Consider, for example, a convexity in the coastline. If it is relatively deep, it might be
considered a bay. If the convexity is shallow, however, so that it offers nothing of value for
shipping (protection from the weather on open seas) and is unlikely to be used for a port, it is
unlikely to be considered a bay.
Bays and similar formations, like river mouths, are considered inland waters, and thus not
even the right of innocent passage applies to them. The reason is plain. Foreign states do not
need to traverse these areas in order to go from one place to another (except to ports in the bay or
on the rivers), so the value of such a right is low for foreign states. At the same time, these are
sensitive and congested areas and thus suitable for maximum control by the coastal state.
Interestingly, states generally permit foreign sovereigns to regulate the “internal economy” of
ships at port (for example, employer-worker relations) and claim jurisdiction only when
activities on the ship disturb the peace or in some other way cause harm to the state’s interest (for
example, smuggling and serious crimes).22
Because the UNCLOS rules treat bays as part of the inland waters, UNCLOS provides
additional rules so that states don’t opportunistically claim enormous portions of the oceans as
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bays.23 A straight line is drawn across the bay; the territorial sea begins only at that point. Similar
rules are used to handle reefs and the other geographic formations noted above.24
States’ near-exclusive control over their coastal seas has created special problems where
their coastal seas are unusually important areas of transit for other nations. This arises in two
situations: straits and archipelagos. Straits are narrow passages that connect large bodies of water
that contain areas of high seas. Because the passages are narrow—they lie between bodies of
land only a few miles apart—they are part of the territorial seas of the state or states that control
those bodies of land. Naval powers have historically insisted that straits be subject to “the right
to transit passage,” rather than the right to innocent passage. Innocent passage, which requires
that submarines surface and imposes some ambiguous limits on military activities, was not
generous enough to satisfy the naval powers. The United States and other naval powers agreed to
a widening of the territorial seas from six to twelve nautical miles—a development that benefited
coastal states—in return for transit passage through straits.25
A great deal can turn on whether a waterway is classified as a strait or not. The United
States and Canada have long disputed whether the “Northwest Passage,” a route through
Canada’s northern archipelago that connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, constitutes a strait.
Canada argues that no strait exists; the waters constitute its internal waters.26 The United States
and other countries argue that a strait does exist. If a strait does exist, foreign vessels may travel
through the Northwest Passage without Canadian permission though they may be subject to
certain regulations, such as pollution control rules. If a strait does not exist, the foreign vessels
may travel through the Northwest Passage only with Canadian permission. UNCLOS does not
resolve the dispute because it does not define “strait.”
Until recently, the dispute was largely academic. The Northwest Passage was almost
always frozen, so ships rarely used it. However, in recent years the ice has retreated, and the
waterway will soon be navigable during substantial portions of the year. Canada has recently
announced plans to patrol the Northwest Passage and to build a deepwater port, while the United
States has said that it will continue to regard it as a strait.
The ultimate resolution of the dispute may well turn on whether Canada actually deploys
the resources to exert control over the strait. If it does, then it is likely in the interest of other
countries that Canada regulate this waterway so that it does not become congested and polluted.
But if Canada claims dominion over the Passage without really exerting control, other countries
will likely ignore its claims. The reason is that if any country X complies with Canadian
23
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regulations, it might fear that other countries Y and Z will not, putting X’s shipping at a
competitive disadvantage.
We now consider the rules relating to the contiguous zone. The contiguous zone, aptly
named, is a zone of water contiguous to the territorial sea. Like the territorial sea, its width is
twelve nautical miles. In the contiguous zone,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory
or territorial sea.27
The coastal state’s power over the contiguous zone is thus more limited than its power over its
territorial seas but that power is still substantial. This arrangement is sensible. Although states
have a weaker interest in regulating behavior in the contiguous zone than in the territorial seas
because there is less congestion and ships in that location pose less danger to the mainland, the
interest is not trivial. In the absence of a contiguous zone, a state’s coast guard would be
powerless, for example, to intercept a suspected smuggler just outside the territorial sea.
C. Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Two further sets of rules extend coastal state’s jurisdictions. First, Article 77 gives
coastal states exclusive rights to exploit the minerals and other natural resources in the
continental shelf. The continental shelf comprises the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance.28
The shelf is so called because the sea floor is not deep. The shelf typically ends in a slope that
reaches the deep sea bed, which is thousands of feet deep. Beyond that point underwater
mountains, ridges, and other protuberances are not counted as part of the continental shelf.
Numerous ambiguities arise because portions of a shelf might continue as a ridge that extends to
the shelves of other coastlines, as in the case of the Lomonosov ridge that extends from Russia to
Canada and Greenland.
Jurisdiction over the continental shelf is defined functionally, unlike jurisdiction over the
territorial sea: the state has exclusive control only for the purpose of research and exploitation of
27
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minerals. It has no control over the waters above the continental shelf unless they fall in some
other designated zone. What distinguishes the continental shelf from the deep sea is that minerals
in the continental shelf can be extracted economically. Exclusive jurisdiction prevents states
from engaging in an inefficient races to control those resources.
Second, Article 56(1) confers on coastal states similar rights for the EEZ, including
“rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the waters superadjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone, such as the production of energy from the water, current and winds.”29 The EEZ extends
200 miles from the baseline used to measure the territorial sea. Other states have full navigation
rights in the EEZ, plus the right to lay down submarine cables.
The EEZ rights apply to the minerals in the continental shelf. The separate rights for the
continental shelf are nevertheless important because a state’s continental shelf may extend
beyond the 200 mile range of the EEZ. In addition, the EEZ covers fisheries and other resources
in the water. Coastal states have a stronger interest in these fisheries than foreign states do, and a
better capacity to regulate them—in both cases because coastal states have the advantage of
proximity.
States initially asserted claims over the mineral resources of their continental shelves and
the fisheries in EEZs (then usually called EFZs, or exclusive fishing zones) in the years
following World War II. The claims over continental shelves were generally accepted, while the
claims over EEZs were often resisted. The famous “cod war” between Britain and Iceland
erupted when Iceland claimed exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries twelve miles from shore.
Eventually Britain accepted Iceland’s claim, and gradually other states accepted EFZ and EEZ
claims that were not too aggressive.30 These developments, later codified in UNCLOS, reflect
the strong economic logic of giving states exclusive jurisdiction over areas that they can control
rather than treating those areas as open access resources.
The melting of the Arctic Ocean has given rise to a similar set of developments. On
August 2, 2007, a Russian mini-sub deposited a Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole.
The evident purpose of this gesture was to help establish a Russian claim to control of mineral
resources over a large portion of the Arctic Ocean, extending from the north coast of Russia to
the North Pole. Russia had filed this claim with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, an agency created by UNCLOS, basing it on the theory that the Lomonosov Ridge, an
underwater mountain range that extended from the Russian coast northward, was part of Russia’s
continental shelf. The Commission can offer an advisory opinion but Russia need not accept it,
and ultimately UNCLOS does not provide a method for resolving Russia’s claims legally.
Indeed, if the Lomonosov Ridge is properly understood to be continental shelf, then Canada and
Denmark (through Greenland) have equally good claims to it, and UNCLOS says only that the
affected countries have an obligation to negotiate a resolution.
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Critics argue that Russia’s flag dropping gesture was an anachronistic appeal to
nineteenth century norms of territorial conquest, but we think that those norms make sense even
in the modern world. As we have argued, parceling out ocean resources to countries that can
actually control them makes a great deal of sense, and Russia was essentially demonstrating that
it, unlike other countries, has the capacity to regulate mining in Arctic waters. Other countries
cannot match Russia’s northern ports and fleet of ice-breakers, and until they can, their claims
are not likely to be taken seriously. They may well decide to defer to Russian claims because of
the high cost of exercising control over arctic waters from distant shores, especially given the
fact that oil and other minerals are bought and sold in the world market, so there is a limit on the
rents that Russia can extract in the form of high prices. Meanwhile, Russia will have an incentive
to prevent overexploitation and other types of harms. This may well be preferable to
nonregulation or overlapping regulation.
D. Division and the Equidistant Rule
A recurrent problem that extends across many of these different topics is that of dividing
areas to which states have overlapping claims. If a body of water less than 24 miles wide divides
two states, then their territorial seas overlap. Similar conflicts can arise over contiguous zones
and the EEZ, and even inland waters—as when states share a bay. Many coastal states share a
single continental shelf. In all these cases, the states must divide jurisdiction over the resource.
Many states have used a simple equidistance rule to resolve these disagreements. The
equidistance rule simple draws a line across the area in question, so that any point that is closer
to one coastal state is deemed to be subject to that state’s jurisdiction and control. The rule is not
codified in UNCLOS, but it is popular as a matter of practice.31
However, the equidistance rule does have a limitation: it sometimes seems unfair. In the
North Sea case, the International Court of Justice faced a conflict between Germany, the
Netherlands, and Denmark over the continental shelf projecting from all three coasts into the
North Sea. The Netherlands and Denmark argued that the equidistance rule should be used.
Germany argued that application of the rule would be unfair because Germany’s coastline in the
relevant area was convex—curved inward, with the result that Germany would be entitled to a
smaller share than it would if its coastline was straight or concave—while the convex coasts of
the Netherlands and Denmark gave them a greater share. The ICJ agreed, ruling that the
equidistance rule is not a norm of customary international law, and leaving it to the parties to
hash out an agreement.32
The ICJ based its decision on equity or fairness. It is surely true that there is nothing
particularly fair about the equidistance rule, which does indeed favor states with convex coasts
and disfavor states with concave coasts. But the same point can be made about virtually all the
rules of the law of the sea, which make states’ rights dependent on arbitrary features of their
31
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coastline such as its length; why is curvature more arbitrary than length?33 Indeed, dozens of
landlocked states have virtually no rights to the sea.34 Accordingly, fairness does not provide
much guidance here.35 By contrast, the equidistance rule does have a good efficiency
justification. States that are closer to a portion of the sea are generally in a better position to
control it. By granting the closer state jurisdiction, the equidistance rule on average favors the
state that can more cheaply regulate.
E. Deep Seabed
The deep seabed contains extensive mineral deposits. Although at present they cannot be
exploited economically, states have long believed that technology would eventually develop to
the point that deep seabed exploitation would be economically advantageous. Since the 1970s,
the developing states have tried to establish a principle that the deep seabed is the “common
heritage of mankind” and therefore that the economic value of resources in the seabed should be
shared among nations. Developed nations generally resisted this view.36
During the negotiations that led up to UNCLOS, an initial compromise provided for the
creation of an international agency (the ominously named “Authority”) and an international
corporation (the “Enterprise”) that would license and regulate deep sea exploration and mining.
Developing nations would receive royalties and technology transfers. After the United States
balked, a subsequent draft of the treaty weakened the Authority (and strengthened influence of
developed nations over it), eliminated some advantages given to the Enterprise, and enlarged the
freedom of private corporations to engage in mineral extraction without international
interference.
The current regime, which was agreed to in 1994, can be described, briefly, as follows.37
Private mining enterprises must obtain permission of the Authority before exploring and
exploiting the deep seabed, the portion of the seabed that lies outside of the jurisdiction of states
under the other provisions of UNCLOS. In order to obtain a license, the mining enterprises must
be sponsored by a member state, and show that they meet certain standards of technological and
financial capacity. The original treaty required mining companies to transfer technology to the
Enterprise and developing states; the 1994 revision eliminated this requirement but continues to
obligate them to transfer technology to the Enterprise and developing states “on fair and
reasonable commercial terms and conditions, consistent with the effective protection of
intellectual property rights.”38 This provision could conceivably be read to require some kind of
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forced albeit compensated transfer—with the amount of compensation to be determined by the
Authority itself, or by other relevant institutions and states.39
When private mining enterprises seek the approval of the Authority for a plan of work,
their application must identify two mining sites. The applicant would have the right to exploit the
first; the second would be reserved for the Enterprise or developing states. (Initially, the
Enterprise would be required to act through joint ventures; later, it would operate as a standalone mining company.) The Authority may turn down applications for the following reasons:
(1) the area has already been claimed by or assigned to another applicant; (2) the mining
activities would cause significant harm to the marine environment; and (3) the applicant is
sponsored by a state that has sponsored an excessive amount of mining activity. This last socalled “anti-monopoly clause” relies on two alternative tests: the applicant’s state sponsors
activities covering 30 percent of a 400,000 square kilometer circle surrounding either of the two
sites in the application, or those activities cover (roughly) two percent of the deep seabed area
subject to the mining regime. Conceivably, the Authority could also set production limits where
seabed mining threatens exports of competing commodities from developing countries.40
Mining companies that are approved would be required to provide significant operational
information to the Authority, so that it could ensure that they comply with the terms of their
contract and do not violate regulations. The mining companies would have to pay an initial
application fee and then annual royalties, which would be set by the Authority. Surplus revenues
of the Authority and the Enterprise would be distributed to states on an “equitable” basis, with
preference for developing states whose commodity exports compete with the products of seabed
mining.
Overall, the deep seabed regime has three features that trouble its critics.41 First, it
provides for redistribution of wealth (including intellectual property) to developing nations—as
compared to a baseline where states (or their mining companies) kept whatever they exploited.
Second, it imposes a number of restrictions on the free exercise of the market. Here, the baseline
would be a system in which the Authority merely recorded and enforced claims on a first-in-time
basis, so as to prevent conflicting and overlapping claims. Production controls, technology
transfer, anti-monopoly rules, and the Enterprise would be unnecessary. Third, it creates an
international bureaucracy dominated by developing countries, which would further strengthen
the redistributive and regulatory themes of the UNCLOS by interpreting vague terms to promote
those goals.
Let us briefly address these three concerns.42 Economic analysis usually puts questions of
distribution to one side; there is no distinctive economic perspective on optimal distribution.
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From the perspective of general utilitarian ethics, as well as certain approaches to fairness, poor
people should receive transfers of wealth from richer people, and it would seem to follow that
poorer countries should receiver transfers from richer countries. For these reasons, some form of
redistribution may be defended.
Economic analysis can, however, distinguish better and worse forms of redistribution.
Poorer states should prefer cash transfers to in-kind transfers such as technology transfers and
subsidization of the Enterprise, which, for reasons we give below, may well be objectionable.
The reason is that poor countries can always use cash transfers to purchase intellectual property
if that is in their interest; if it is not, they can put cash transfers to their best use, for example, to
build medical clinics or schools. We should also note that some scholars are skeptical about
whether even cash transfers from rich countries to poor countries actually help poor countries.43
If these transfers are mainly enjoyed by corrupt elites, then the case for redistribution is
obviously weakened.
The market restrictions are also open to fair criticism. We cannot think of an efficiency
justification for the creation of the Enterprise, which, like most state-owned enterprises, is likely
to be less efficient than private firms. Now, if the Enterprise competed with private mining firms
on an equal basis, creating it would do no harm. In the unlikely event that it operated more
efficiently than private firms, consumers would gain. In the more likely event that it operated
less efficiently than private firms, it would be driven from the market and the only loss would be
the costs of setting up the institution in the first place. However, the Enterprise would not
compete with private mining firms on an equal basis. The latter would subsidize the Enterprise
by engaging in exploration on its behalf and possibly making technological transfers to it; it is
also possible that royalties and other fees would be used to subsidize it. As a result, the
Enterprise could survive in the market even if it is operated less efficiently than the private firms
are. This deadweight loss is an avoidable consequence of the seabed mining regime.
The other market restrictions are equally dubious. Consider the anti-monopoly rules.
Given that commodities mined from the seabed will enter a market that consists of commodities
that are also mined on land, the risk of monopoly in output markets is remote—a nation’s share
of deep sea mining in the immediate area of a site or in the seabed as a whole bears no systematic
relation to market power. Legitimate antitrust concerns can be addressed by making firms subject
to the antitrust laws of their sponsoring (and customer) states.
To the degree that the “anti-monopoly” rules are really aimed at distributing wealth
equitably among states, they are an inefficient mechanism. In general, production controls are a
notoriously bad way of subsidizing inefficient firms. If seabed mining harms the export
industries of developing nations and some palliative is necessary from the standpoint of
distributive justice, the efficient response would be to offer cash compensation to those industries
or nations. Placing a cap on seabed mining in order to keep the cost of commodities artificially
high hurts poor as well as rich people who buy products for which those commodities are inputs;
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and it may help relatively wealthy workers and shareholders in poor countries rather than poor
people in poor countries. The anti-monopoly rules may also foreclose the most efficient private
mining companies from the opportunity to exploit particular deposits and divert the mining to
less efficient firms sponsored by “non-monopoly” states.
The rule that applicants must discover and turn over a second mining site is another
inefficient form of taxation. This rule raises the applicants’ costs without necessarily providing a
benefit to anyone—it may turn out that the second site cannot be economically exploited once
output from the first site enters the market. If the purpose of the rule is to subsidize the
Enterprise or redistribute wealth to developing nations, and this purpose is appropriate, then a
cash tax would be a more efficient device. Similarly, the technology transfer rules are at best
unnecessary and at worst another inefficient tax. If technology transfer takes place only at market
prices, then a rule is not necessary—the transaction would occur without the rule. If, as some
fear, technology transfer would be forced, this just means that the market price would not be
paid. Private mining firms would underinvest in research and development if they must share the
proceeds with others.
This brings us to the third set of concerns involving the institutional dimension of the
seabed regime. Because no state has the power to control the deep seabed effectively given
current technology, UNCLOS does not assign jurisdiction to states. In this sense, the seabed is
like the open water subject to the freedom of the seas. But because exploitation is potentially
economical down the road, there remains a potential problem of overuse—here, technically, the
problem of excessive investment in search.44 Because no nation is the cheapest regulator of the
deep seabed, an international authority, supported by all states, suggests itself as a natural
alternative. An additional reason for such an authority is that states cannot agree on all rules for
the exploitation of seabed minerals because of conflicting interests. Many issues are thus left to
the international agency to resolve at a later date.
The problem with this approach is that there is no guarantee that the international agency
will in the long run act in the interest of states in general. Treaty designers thus face some
familiar tradeoffs. States will submit to an international agency’s jurisdiction only if they expect
the gains to be greater than their returns to opting out and enjoying the benefits of the preUNCLOS regime. For most states, the implicit “reservation price” is low or zero because they
have no capacity to exploit underwater resources in the high seas. But for the United States, at
least, the price is relatively high because it expects that its firms will eventually be able to exploit
deep sea resources. Accordingly, the United States, and countries in its position, need a
guarantee that the Authority will not act against its interests. Only a unanimity rule or a veto
right for the United States and similarly situated countries can provide clear assurance in this
regard, but a unanimity rule would make decision-making too difficult, and a veto right would
enable the United States to demand an excessive share of the rents created by the legal regime.
However, if other nations have veto rights, they can prevent mineral exploitation by Americans
unless the United States makes concessions to them. The current compromise features a complex
44
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power-sharing arrangement; only time will tell whether it will promote the economically justified
or economically dubious aspects of the regime.45
The three concerns articulated by the critics have force. However, it would be a mistake
to conclude that the seabed regime of UNCLOS is necessarily a bad one on balance. On the
benefit side, the seabed regime can clearly perform an important function by enabling mining
firms to stake claims and thus obtain property rights in minerals in the deep sea bed. Firms would
do less in the way of duplicative search and exploitation efforts; this would both encourage
research and avoid overexploitation of discovered resources. Many of the other rules, such as
those that restrict damage to the marine environment, are also important.
In an ideal world, we might advocate a further revision of the rules to eliminate the
inefficiencies noted above. A better approach would simply allow mining operations to establish
clear property rights over exploitable seabed resources, much as governments have awarded
rights to prospectors on land. Property rights over discrete areas of the seabed, awarded at a point
in time before companies make excessive sunk investments in search, seem like the best way to
provide proper incentives for exploitation.46 To the degree that such a system would award
excessive rents to developed countries from a distributive standpoint, some system for
redistributing cash compensation to developing countries might be devised.
At this stage, however, we suspect that political realities preclude such a renegotiation.
The various market restrictions and technology-transfer requirements have bought the assent of
developing nations, and the mining authority has the ability to create property rights and regulate
against abuses in a manner that improves on the potential chaos of a pure open access system.
Despite its imperfections, it is important to recognize that the UNCLOS regime may be
significantly better than none at all.
Likewise, we are skeptical of proposals for countries like the United States to enter a
stripped-down seabed treaty with the handful of developed states that have firms capable of deep
seabed mineral exploitation. To be sure, such an arrangement would cut out the developing
countries and avoid any need to “pay them off.” Even if such an approach could be defended
from a distributive standpoint, it would sacrifice the other benefits of UNCLOS, and would be
beset with its own economic weaknesses. Among other things, international capital is mobile,
and mining companies could simply relocate to non-member states if they wished to avoid the
regulatory regime (much as shipping companies have at times avoided regulation by registering
their ships with developing countries and flying their flags). Any regime that permitted such de
facto “opt out” might accomplish little.
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F. Fisheries
Fisheries (and whaleries) vary in their characteristics. Some fish occupy a relatively
stable and confined area in the sea. Other fish migrate great distances. Certain species spawn in
rivers and then head out to sea; other species go in the reverse direction. Some types of sea life
are sedentary (like oysters) or crawl along the seabed (like lobsters).
UNCLOS handles some of the attendant issues in a straightforward fashion. Fisheries that
fall entirely within the EEZ, territorial seas, or inland waters of a single state are subject
exclusively to the regulation of that state. At least in theory, it should have the correct incentives
to regulate the fishery. The UNCLOS regime does not mandate efficient regulation, of course,
but simply empowers the single regulator to do what is necessary, and trusts it to proceed
appropriately.
In contrast, fisheries in the high seas are not subject to regulation under UNCLOS rules.
To the extent that such fisheries have avoided overexploitation to date, that fortunate result is
simply because it is too costly for commercial operations to harvest at a level that would
represent overfishing.
The biggest challenges are posed by fisheries that cross the EEZs of different states or
that straddle an EEZ and the high seas. This has been a particular problem for whales. The states
that share in the fishery (or whalery) have an incentive to overexploit the resource for the reasons
we described in Part I. States have tried to overcome this problem in a series of treaties but the
results so far have been disappointing. The failure of fishery and whalery regimes is a case study
of the collective action problem. States can agree, but they cannot enforce.
States have also approached the overfishing problem with restrictions on particular
technologies, such as drift nets, which also damage other forms of marine life.47 By raising the
cost of exploiting the fishery, these rules may temporarily mitigate overexploitation.
In sum, UNCLOS itself has few provisions that specifically address fisheries but its rules
clearly have an impact on the management of fisheries. Aside from the rights granted by
UNCLOS regarding fisheries contained in the exclusive regulatory zones of member states,
much of the remaining international law governing fisheries is contained in other international
agreements. On the whole, the resulting body of law is less than fully satisfactory, although it is
hardly clear that solutions to the remaining problems exist that would cost less than the benefits.
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G. Summary of General Themes
We can summarize as follows. The first and most basic point is that many of the
resources of the sea require regulation to protect against overexploitation, excessive investment
in search, and related externality problems. The core challenge for an international agreement
regulating the sea is to assign regulatory authority to the most efficient regulator. In this regard,
the value of a sea resource to land-based actors tends to diminish with distance from the shore,
and the cost of regulating that resource for land-based actors rises with distance from the shore.
This explains why states’ regulatory authority declines with distance from the shore.
This theory also sheds light on the evolution of the law. For many centuries, going back
at least to the eighteenth, the territorial sea was only three miles wide. This was the distance of a
cannon shot, and the so-called cannonball rule thus made it clear that the territorial sea was
premised on the territorial state’s ability to control it. After World War II, the United States
claimed its continental shelf and other states followed suit. In the next decades, states also
claimed broader territorial seas and economic zones.48 UNCLOS would recognize many of these
claims, as we have seen, settling on a twelve-mile coastal sea, 200-mile EEZ, and so forth. The
evident explanation is the development of technology, which makes possible control of the sea at
greater distances from the shore, and at the same time, puts sea resources farther from the shore
in greater danger of overexploitation.49 The law evolved to reflect these new realities. As
technology continues to advance, the cost of regulating ocean waters far from shore will decline,
and the benefits of ocean resources far from share will increase. We thus predict that the open
access regime will erode, and that states will claim larger and larger portions of the oceans as
subject to their exclusive or near-exclusive control.
A second fundamental point is that UNCLOS shows a strong preference for carving up
the sea into different regulatory domains controlled by different states, and against international
regulation by international agencies. The reason for this preference is that states are better
regulators than international agencies are. International agencies can only operate with the
consent of all or most states, which makes them slow and inefficient.
Third, the particular bundles of jurisdictional rights in the different zones reflect a
tradeoff between the benefits of conferring regulatory authority on a single state—which thus
obtains the costs and residual benefits of regulation—and the risk that, by granting a monopoly
to a coastal state, the state will exclude other states or otherwise interfere with their use of the
resources. Typically, the law resolves the tension by giving foreign states discrete rights (for
example, innocent passage) while giving the coastal state otherwise plenary jurisdictional
authority.
Fourth, UNCLOS responds to the legitimate equitable interests of poor nations in a
confusing and occasionally unwise fashion. In some respects, it completely ignores issues of
fairness. States with the longest coasts benefit the most from its rules; landlocked states benefit
48
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very little. Where UNCLOS tries to redistribute to poor nations, it relies too much on inefficient
restrictions on market activity and not enough on cash transfers; where it does rely on cash
transfers, it does little to ensure that the cash goes to the poorest nations (as opposed to nations
that happen to have pivotal votes in the regulatory institutions).
Conclusion: Should the United States Ratify UNCLOS?
We have now argued that UNCLOS is on the whole an efficient agreement from a global
standpoint. With a few exceptions, its major contours have a simple and readily identifiable
efficiency rationale. The United States has yet to ratify the treaty, however, and we now turn to a
narrower question of self-interest—is the United States better off by participating in the treaty
regime than it is by opting out?
This question raises a familiar set of issues relating to what “objective function” the
United States ought employ in deciding whether to ratify. Some observers may believe that the
United States ought behave as an other-regarding nation, and thus accede to any treaty regime
that is globally efficient. If so, the arguments we have set forth above push strongly for
ratification.
Other commentators may allow that the United States should act in more self-interested
fashion, yet believe that international cooperation on the law of the sea is part of a greater
strategic game involving cooperation on many fronts. Here, too, an argument might be made for
accession to a globally efficient arrangement on the grounds that such behavior will support
broader coordination on globally efficient policies that will in the aggregate benefit the United
States regardless of whether UNCLOS viewed in isolation confers a benefit.
Still other commentators may insist that the United States not ratify UNCLOS unless it
can be demonstrated that UNCLOS alone is a source of net benefits for the United States. From
this perspective, the most cogent criticism of UNCLOS focuses on the seabed provisions
contained in Part XI.50 We argued above that even if the seabed provisions are not optimal, they
are likely better than nothing, given the risks of overexploitation.
Critics also worry about a provision that gives the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea jurisdiction when naval forces seize a vessel on the high seas.51 Although another
provision creates an exception for “military activities … by government vessels and aircraft
engaged in non-commercial service,”52 a narrow interpretation of this section would interfere
with efforts to inspect and detain vessels being operated by criminals and terrorists.53 However,
we suspect that these concerns are more theoretical than real. Customary international law
already forbids naval forces to stop and detain foreign vessels on the high seas merely on the
50

See supra.
Art. 290(5).
52
Art. 298(1)(b).
53
See Jeremy Rabkin, supra note ___, at 3-4. For a discussion of the relationship between UNCLOS and the
Proliferation Security Initiative, a 2003 agreement among states to intercept ships suspected of carrying weapons of
mass destruction, see Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping Jurisdiction,
in The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, supra note___, at 346, 356-61.
51

26

suspicion of criminality (there are exceptions for piracy and the slave trade, which UNCLOS
preserves). UNCLOS thus maintains the status quo in this respect. This means that under current
law, if U.S. forces do detain vessels controlled by suspected terrorists, the United States takes the
risk that other nations will issue diplomatic protests and seek legal remedies. The novelty
introduced by UNCLOS is just Tribunal jurisdiction. If the Tribunal adopts the broad
interpretation, the United States will benefit, because its preferred rule will be incorporated into
international law. If the Tribunal adopts the narrow interpretation, the United States will not be
harmed, because the status quo legal rule will be maintained. The only risk is that the Tribunal
will adopt an interpretation that is even narrower than current law. But this risk seems remote.54
UNCLOS is sensible from both a global and an American standpoint. A better treaty
could be imagined, but if, as seems likely, no alternative treaty could be negotiated as a
replacement, the United States would be well-advised to ratify.
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